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Summary
Financial and economic crisis from 2008 created debt problems throughout the 
world, in developed and developing coutries. Although the problems cause by the 
crisis were similar for all coutries there were some specifi c diferences between them. 
Here, eff ects of fi rm’s indebtedness in the Republic of Srpska are analysed in compar-
ison with 15 European countries before and aft er the crisis, which serve as a bench-
mark. In the RS and also other considered countries in the collapse year (2009), the 
relative debt increases of under and over median fi rms diff ered drastically. In the 
main crisis year of 2009 the RS had 2 percentage points higher impact (relative to 
the Core European countries) of the fi nancial accelerator or/and correspondingly 
diff erent eff ect of the shape of fi rm investment distribution on the debt increase. In 
2009, country specifi c eff ects on the debt build-up process disappeared for all other 
observed countries except the RS, while in the year aft er the collapse they disap-
peared in the RS and picked upped again in all other countries, showing lagging of 
the impact of the crisis as well as a milder eff ect in the RS.
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Резиме
Финансијска и економска криза из 2008. године је створила проблем дуга 
широм свијета, како у развијеним земљама, тако и у онима у развоју. Иако 
су проблеми изазвани кризом били слични за све земље, постоје неке специ-
фичне разлике између њих. Ефекти задужености фирми у Републици Срп-
ској су анализирани у поређењу са 15 европских земаља, прије и послије кри-
зе, које служе као мјерило. У Републици Српској као и у другим посматраним 
земљама у години колапса (2009.) повећања релативног дуга мањих и већих 
фирми се драстично разликују. У главној кризној години (2009.) Република 
Српска  је имала за два процентна поена  већи утицај финансијског акце-
лератора (у односу на главне европске земље) и / или одговарајуће другачији 
ефекат облика дистрибуције инвестиција фирме на повећање дуга. У 2009. 
год специфични ефекти земље на процес стварања дуга су нестали за све 
посматране земље осим Републике Српске, док су у години након колапса 
нестали у Републици Српској, а поново се јавили у свим осталим земљама, 
што показује одлагање ефеката кризе, те блаже ефекте у Републици Срп-
ској.
Кључне ријечи: Република Српска, дуг, БДП по глави становника, реце-
сија, финансијске инвестиције,задуженост.
Introduction
Although the Western Balkan countries were hardly hit by the present crisis 
they have been given much less attention than other comparable economies in 
the world (Chakrabarti, 2012). Still the eff ect of the crisis varies both in size and 
timing as various factors infl uenced the transmission of the global crisis (among 
others the openness and structure of the economy, institutional setting of the 
capital and labor market, indebtedness of sectors, etc.). In addition, diff erent ef-
forts to address the crisis and to overcome its consequences have been proposed. 
Even though the majority of fi rms were aff ected in some way, this paper analyses 
how fi rm indebtedness aff ected fi rms in Th e Republic of Srpska of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (hereinaft er RS) compared to 15 European countries before and af-
ter the crisis which serve as a benchmark. In particular, we analyse data gathered 
for fi rms in RS, Slovenia, Croatia, the Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Ser-
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bia, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Germany, France, Austria, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Hungary.
Firstly, we briefl y present the relevant macroeconomic situation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (hereinaft er BIH) and RS. Th is is followed by methodological 
background, which extends the research done by Prašnikar et al. (2012) where 
the relative position of 16 European countries in non-fi nancial corporation debt 
increase and level achieved in the 2006–2010 is documented. We continue with 
empirical evidence from the model of the fi nancial accelerator specifi cation, 
which is enlarged by country dummies and give our conclusions at the end. 4
1. Institutional setting and macroeconomic picture of Republic of 
Srpska 5 
Despite many years of consecutive growth, the country’s GDP fi gures are 
still quite low. GDP per capita in the RS increased from 2,164 EUR in 2006 to 
2,959 EUR in 2010. Economic growth was stimulated by international assistance, 
increased foreign and domestic investments, the credit boom funded by foreign 
banks and booming domestic demand fi nanced from abroad (Prašnikar 
and Knežević Cvelbar, 2012). In the period 2005–2008, the sectors of trade, 
agriculture, construction, manufacturing and real estate, renting, and business 
activities contributed to the nominal growth of GDP most.
One of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s main goals aft er the war was to create a 
stable currency, with which they could control infl ation. To ensure the stability 
they decided to adopt the currency board and pegged their Bosnian Convertible 
Mark to the German Mark and then to the Euro. Consequent to the sucsessfull 
implementation the infl ation was put under control and in 2010 infl ation in the 
RS was just 2.5 percent.
Increased stability and healthy economic conditions also laid the foundations 
for the development of the fi nancial sector. Th is was mostly true for the banking 
sector, where many foreign banks entered and attained a dominant position. 
Th ey became the most important channel of foreign capital infl ow to the country 
and signifi cantly contributed to the economic growth, which was mainly based 
on a credit expansion (Bartlett and Monastiriotis, 2010). Growth in the amount 
of loans in the years before the crisis was very high and in that period household 
debt as well as fi nancial and non-fi nancial institutions debt increased (see Table 
1). When the crisis struck the worsening fi nancial health of companies and 
households meant that banks cut back their loan portfolios and credit growth 
4 Work in progress: preliminary results.
5 We discuss data on RS when they are available. If not, data for the whole of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are discussed. 
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was stopped. An important event in the banking sector was the signing of the 
Memorandum of Understanding with parent banks in the European Union (EU). 
Th is obliged banks to keep exposure related to capital funding and keep the same 
level of loans as in 2008 (Prašnikar and Knežević Cvelbar, 2012). In addition, 
the new 24 month Stand-by arrangement with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (of 520$ million) also presents a powerful buff er against external shocks 
from ongoing Euro area crisis shocks and reduced loans from foreign banks.
Diffi  cult business conditions and limited access to sources of funding led 
banks to the implementation of more restrictive lending policies, with the aim to 
maintain business stability and safety as well as preserve liquidity (IRBRS, 2011). 
However, the 2011 growth was again supported by positive trends in the banking 
sector where long- and short-term corporate loans grew in the fi rst nine months 
by 4 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively. (IRBRS, 2012). 
Th e recession had a big impact also on the country’s fi scal position. While in 
2007 there was no general government defi cit in the RS, it reached 9 percent of 
GDP just two years later (IMF, 2011). To tackle the threatened macroeconomic 
stability and low public confi dence in a Stand-by Arrangement with the IMF, 
BIH committed itself to implement comprehensive fi scal austerity measures and 
structural reforms and to focus on fi rm restructuring (EBRD, 2011).
Table 1: Key macroeconomic and indebtedness indicators for RS
Category / sub-category 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Basic macroeconomic data
GDP (in million EUR) 3,346 3,759 4,341 4,204 4,247 4,433
GDP per capita (in EUR) 2,317 2,611 3,020 2,930 2,964 3,100 
Real GDP growth rate (in %) 6.0 6.7 6.2 -3.0 0.8 0.8
CPI (average change in %) 6.4 1.1 7.2 -0.4 2.5 3.9
General government debt
Gross (in % of GDP)* 21.8 32.9 31.2 36.1 39.6 n/a
Net (in % of GDP)* 13.6 18.5 21.8 27.5 32.5 n/a
General government primary net 
lending/borrowing (in % of GDP) 2.0 0.4 -0.8 -6.6 -5.0 -0.7 
Household debt
Gross* 24.0 29.4 31.8 31.8 31.7 n/a
Non-financial institutions’ debt
Gross* (in % of GDP) 25.9 30.7 36.3 36.9 38.6 n/a
Financial Institutions
Gross debt (in % of GDP) 43.3 68.1 65.1 58.0 57.0 n/a
Leverage of domestic banks 12.7 8.9 9.6 10.2 13.0 n/a
Bank claims on public sector (in % of 
GDP) 0.7 1.3 2.4 3.3 3.8 n/a
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Category / sub-category 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
External liabilities
Gross (in % of GDP) 25.9 22.1 20.7 22.6 26.5 n/a
Government debt held abroad* (in 
% of GDP) 22.4 20.5 20.8 26.4 31.5 n/a
* Data for BIH
Source: Cirman et. al., 2012; BIH Agency for Statistics, 2011; Central Bank of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 2011; IMF, 2012; IRBRS, 2012; Republic of Srpska Institute of Statistics, 2011.
2. Methodological basis for the research
When speaking of frictions in fi nancial markets, they lead to ineffi  cient func-
tioning’s of markets, which are not accounted for in standard macroeconomic 
models (Stiglitz, 2011). Based on the literature on asymmetric information and 
agency costs in lending relationship, in their seminal work, Bernarke et. al. (1999) 
present how the fi nancial accelerator drives the endogenous development in 
credit markets, which results in strong propagation and amplifi cation of (exter-
nal) macroeconomic shocks. In the model, the entrepreneurs’ net worth comes 
from two sources: profi ts (including capital gains) accumulated from previous 
capital investment and income from supplying labour. With the presence of capi-
tal market frictions, net worth matters because a borrower’s fi nancial position 
is a key determinant of his cost of external fi nance. Higher levels of net worth 
allow increased self-fi nancing, mitigating the agency problems associated with 
external fi nance and reducing the external fi nance premium. An unanticipated 
rise in asset prices raises net worth more than proportionately, which stimulates 
investment, and in turn, raises prices even further (the so-called fi nancial accel-
erator). As actual returns of indebt fi rms are higher than expected, this leads to 
bubbles which might lead to a balance sheet crisis aft er the crisis evolves (Ber-
nanke et al., 1999; Miller and Stiglitz, 2010; Bole et al., 2012a), where collaterals 
and contagions become important factors for the amplifi cation of the crisis. It is, 
thus, the mechanism of the fi nancial accelerator, which endogenously drove the 
amplifi cation and propagation of the process of companies’ debt accumulation, 
triggered by external shocks.
Th e dynamics of the potential main debt drivers in the RS, namely, core and 
fi nancial investments, are being studied. We identifi ed factors, which could, 
besides the median dynamics of core and fi nancial investments, considerably 
infl uence the impact of the investments on the debt build-up process of 
companies. Country diff erences in the fi nancial intermediation system, company 
leverage and the way of their fi nancing, the size of companies etc. could result in 
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the country specifi c size of the fi nancial accelerator, which could also seriously 
modify the eff ects of the same (median) investment dynamics of the debt process.
In the following section, the evolution of the fi rm distribution of debt, core 
and fi nancial investments is documented for the boom-bust period 2007–2010. 
Th e simple model of the debt build-up process is specifi ed using the fi nancial 
accelerator model as a starting point. Country group eff ects are estimated 
using fi xed dummies. Th e main focus is placed on the analysed debt increasing 
trajectory in the 2007–2010 period, where the RS is compared to other sample 
European countries.
3. Empirical evidence on the fi rm debt, core investments and fi nancial 
investments distribution in the boom-boost period 2007–2010
Description of the data for the RS 
Th e initial fi rm’s indebtedness analysis of the RS is based on fi nancial data 
from the Amadeus Database. Our sample included 477 companies. However, the 
sample was further reduced to 399 companies, to only include those with a non-
zero fi nancial debt and available data on all variables used in the estimation of the 
model. Th e median values of the observed fi rms for the selected variables per unit 
of average total balance sheet are reported in Table 2. 
Table 2: Median values of three selected variables in proportion to average total assets
Variable 2007 2008 2009 2010
Financial debt 0.116 0.131 0.138 0.144
Investments in core activities 0.057 0.071 0.039 0.039
Financial investments 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Source: Cirman et. Al., 2012; Amadeus Database, 2012; own calculations.
Figure 1: Yearly diff erences in fi nancial debt  Figure 2: Investments in core activities 
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Figure 3: Investments in fi nancial assets
Source: Cirman et. Al., 2012; Amadeus Database, 2012; own calculations.
In the 2007–2010 period fi nancial debt as a proportion of the average balance 
sheet sum of a median fi rm in the RS increased for 2.8 percentage points of the 
balance sheet. Th e dynamic of the debt increase was, however, severely biased to 
upper part of fi rms distribution, as documented in Figure 1, which shows yearly 
diff erences in fi nancial debt. Th e fi gure also shows, that biasedness decreased 
considerably aft er 2008. Namely, the 90th percentile fi rm (the most indebted fi rms 
in the sample) began to slow debt increasing signifi cantly, aft er 2008.
Investments in core activities as a proportion of average balance sheet sum of 
a median fi rm decreased in 2009 signifi cantly and the behaviour was also similar 
for the 10th and 90th percentile fi rms (Figure 2 and Figure 3). Th e median fi rm had 
no fi nancial investments. A 90th percentile fi rm witnessed a substantial decrease 
in fi nancial investments in the observed period, from 1.8 percent of average 
balance sheet sum in 2007 to 0.1 percent of average balance sheet sum in 2010.
Distribution of the enterprise debt process dynamics 
A similar data sampling process and indebtedness and investments movement 
analysis was done for each country in the sample, which accounted for more than 
9,300 companies. Individual reports for the countries can be found in Prašnikar 
(2012).
In Figures 4-7 the dynamics of fi rms’ debt build-up process in RS are 
compared with corresponding process in Europe for the 2007–2010 boom-bust 
period. Financial debt increments are given in units of balance sheet sum. Th e 
distribution of dynamics is presented for fi ve quintiles (p10, p25, p50, p75 and 
p90) of fi rms from the manufacturing and services sectors. Point estimates are 
given for the RS, and intervals are provided (maximal and minimal values) for all 
other studied European countries. 
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Figure 4: Debt build-up process, 2007  Figure 5: Debt build-up process, 2008
 
Figure 6: Debt build-up process, 2009  Figure 7: Debt build-up process, 2010
 
Source: Amadeus Database, 2012; own calculations.
In RS, the high increases in debt before 2009 and drops following were only 
limited to a small share (around 10-25 per cent) of fi rms. Th e presented yearly 
distributions of the debt increase in 2007 show that the median fi rm had no 
increase, while the debt increments in the fi rst quartile were negative (in absolute 
terms less than 5 per cent of balance sheet sum) and at third quartile positive (and 
less than 5 per cent of balance sheet sum). In RS the impact of the factors, which 
drove the debt process in 2007 was negligible. It was close to the lowest non-BS 
country and much lower than for the highest benchmarking country (the upper 
end of other European countries for 2007 and 2008 pertains to Slovenia, which 
had particularly higher increases in debt than other studied countries).
However, in 2008 one can already notify changes in the (relative) dynamics 
of indebtedness of the third and fourth quartiles companies in the RS , which 
highly increased its fi nancial debt. In the collapse year (2009), the relative debt 
increases of companies in the RS under and over the median diff ered drastically. 
Namely, over median fi rms’ debt increments in the RS were near and over the 
highest values (for the corresponding quartiles) of the other studied European 
countries. At the same time the under median quartiles of fi rms in RS decreased 
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debt similarly as the average deleveraging quartiles of fi rms in the benchmark 
countries. Th is result probably refl ects the delay in crisis eff ects in the RS. In 2010 
the debt increases were smaller again. 
Distribution of the fi rm core investments process dynamics 
Two factors of the debt increasing process are explicitly studied, fi rms’ core 
investments and fi nancial investments. In what follows, core investments are 
defi ned as a sum of fi xed capital investments, change in inventories and other 
investments in working capital. 
Th e distribution of the fi rm core investments dynamics is illustrated in Figures 
8-11. Core investments fi gures are given in units of total balance sheet sum. 
Similar to the fi nancial debt fi gures, core investments dynamics are presented for 
fi ve quintiles of RS fi rms as well as for interval (upper and lower) values of core 
investments in corresponding quintiles, for the studied European countries. 
Figure 8: Core investments dynamics, 2007  Figure 9: Core investments dynamics, 2008
 
Figure 10: Core investments dynamics, 2009  Figure 11: Core investments dynamics, 2010
 
Source: Ajpes, Amadeus Database, 2012; own calculations.
Observing the fi rm distribution of core investments dynamics between the RS 
and the studied European countries we can see that they were moving similarly 
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as in other countries. Although in the climax of the boom period (in 2007) core 
investments of the RS fi rms were much closer to the minimum of other European 
countries (the maximum again pertains to Slovenia where investments in core 
activities were much higher than in all other studied countries), almost uniformly 
over whole distribution of fi rms. Figures show, heuristically speaking, that fi rms 
in the RS were much less aggressive regarding investments in core activities in the 
boom period, than fi rms in other studied countries over the whole distribution 
of enterprises. 
Figure 10 documents, that in the bust period, the shape of the fi rms’ distribution 
of core investments dynamics moved closer to the maximum (as dynamics of 
other European countries calmed down almost uniformly across fi rms). More 
cautious investment behaviour in boom years obviously enabled fi rms in the RS 
to have (relative to studied countries) stronger investments in crisis years. We can 
also observe that core investments dynamics in boom-bust period (2007–2010) 
in the RS were predominantly concentrated in the last quartile of fi rms. 
Distribution of the fi rm fi nancial investment process dynamics 
Empirically studied fi nancial investments are defi ned as a sum of short and 
long-term fi nancial investments in the debt and equity instruments. Th e fi rm 
distributions of fi nancial investments dynamics are documented in Figures 12-
15. Figures for fi nancial investments are given in units of balance sheet sum. 
Again values for fi ve quintiles are presented for the RS as well as interval (upper 
and lower) values of fi nancial investments for studied European countries in 
corresponding quintiles. 
Figure 12: Financial inv. dynamics, 2007  Figure 13: Financial inv. dynamics, 2008
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Figure 14: Financial inv. dynamics, 2009  Figure 15: Financial inv. dynamics, 2010
 
Source: Ajpes, Amadeus Database, 2012; own calculations.
Th e fi nancial investments fi gures reveal three interesting facts, two of which 
refer to the diff erence between the distribution dynamics of core investments 
dynamics and the corresponding distribution dynamics of fi nancial investments 
and one, which refers to the diff erence between the RS and other European 
countries, the distribution dynamics of fi nancial investments. 
Firstly, in all the studied countries, dynamics of fi nancial investments 
fl uctuated considerably less across fi rms than core investments dynamics 
(diff erences between upper values in the last quintiles and lower values in the 
fi rst quintiles are much smaller). 
Th e second interesting fact pertains to the shape of the fi rm distribution of 
fi nancial investments dynamics. Namely, the fi nancial investments in the whole 
boom-bust period were considerably (more than core investments) limited to a 
small share (around fi rst decile) of fi rms. Concerning the median enterprises there 
were almost no diff erences between countries in the fi nancial investments dynamics. 
Th irdly, in all years of the boom-bust period, the described shape of the 
fi rm fi nancial investment dynamics distribution in the RS coincide with the 
minimum of other European countries for all presented quintiles of fi rms. Th is 
fact documents that conservative investment policies were in place in the RS 
regarding fi nancial investments. 
4. Mechanism of the debt increasing process – quantifi cation of 
country specifi ties
In the analysed boom-bust period 2007–2010, non-fi nancial corporation 
debt increases diff ered enormously among the studied countries. Th e top 
debt performers were Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia, for which fi rm debt 
increased by over 25 percent of GDP. In contrast, Germany, the Republic of 
Macedonia and the Czech Republic lagged behind most, with the debt increase in 
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the non-fi nancial corporations of less than 5 percent of GDP. Such a country rank 
(structure) of the non-fi nancial corporations debt increase seems unexpected, 
because the main debt drivers6 do not show the same country ranks and even 
both exposed groups of countries are diff erent. 
Th e country diff erences in the fi rm distribution of investments and the size 
of the fi nancial accelerator are probably the most important factors behind the 
mentioned country diff erences in the debt driver’s impact on the debt intensity 
process. In short, we will mark these diff erences as country specifi ties (in the 
debt build-up process). Th e high policy makers’ importance of these country 
specifi ties documents the fact that very specifi ties are also crucial for the size of 
the bust damages (lost product and employment) in the studied period 2007–
2010. Namely, the impact of both, the sudden stop eff ect (sudden-unexpected 
drop in the loanable funds infl ow) and collateral amplifi cation eff ect, on the bust 
damages depends on the size of the fi nancial accelerator (and, therefore, the 
average size of fi rms debt dynamics), as well as on the fi rms distribution of debt 
dynamics (conditional on the average size of debt) immediately before the regime 
switch (bubble burst).7 
To quantify the mentioned country specifi ties in the debt build-up process, the 
model of the fi nancial accelerator specifi cation is enlarged by country dummies.8 
It could be expected, that these dummies would predominantly encompass the 
eff ects of the (country) diff erences in the size of the fi nancial accelerator as well 
as the eff ects of the diff erences in the fi rm distribution of investment dynamics. 
Because the model is specifi ed with the fi nancial accelerator, the fi nancial and 
core investments are the main debt drivers in the model. Four dummies were added. 
Th e fi rst dummy stands for the manufacturing enterprises, the second dummy 
for the Balkan group of countries (Slovenia, Croatia, the Republic of Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia), the third dummy stands for the Mediterranean group 
of countries (Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain) and the fourth dummy for the 
RS. Such a specifi cation of the model entails, that countries from the Core of 
Europe (Austria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary and Slovakia) 
fi gure stand as a reference for other countries. Th e sample includes fi nancial 
statements data for over 9,300 manufacturing and service sector companies from 
the mentioned countries.
To mitigate heteroscedasticity problems, debt, fi nancial investments and core 
investments variables are given in units of balance sheet sum. Th e debt model is 
specifi ed and estimated for the boom bust (2007–2010) period, for every year 
6 For more on the theoretical model of the debt drivers in the boom-bust period see Bole et al. 
(2012).
7 See Dagher (2010), Calvo (1998), Calvo et al. (2007) and Miller and Stiglitz (2010).
8 On the specifi cation of the fi nancial accelerator model in debt modelling, see Bole et al. (2012).
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separately. Th e models are estimated with the ordinary least squares method 
(OLS) and, because of possible endogeneity problems, also with instruments. 
Th e lagged values of the explanatory variables, employment and capital are used 
as instruments. Simple OLS estimates of the model are given in Table 2, and 
instrumentalised estimates in the Table 3. Because data for 2006 is not available 
(in estimating the model for 2007, instrumental variables would have to also be 
available for 2006), instrumentalized estimates are given only for the 2008–2010 
period. 
Table 3: Th e OLS estimations of fi nancial debt
2007 2008 2009 2010
Financial investments
0.430*** 0.336*** 0.188*** 0.171***
(0.068) (0.076) (0.037) (0.044)
Investments in core activities
0.213*** 0.000 0.191*** 0.173***
(0.021) (0.000) (0.027) (0.027)
Manufacturing sector (dummy)
-0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Western Balkan countries without the RS 
(dummy)
0.023*** 0.027*** 0.001 0.019***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
The RS (dummy)
0.006 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.006
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Mediterranean countries (dummy)
0.012*** 0.004 -0.001 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant
0.008*** 0.016*** -0.004* -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 9327 9310 9319 9163
R-squared 0.176 0.033 0.096 0.086
Note: Service sector and core European countries serves as a base dummy
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Amadeus, 2012; own calculations.
Table 4: Instrumental variables estimations of fi nancial debt
2008 2009 2010
Financial investments
0.489* -0.078 0.183*
(0.257) (0.267) (0.106)
Investments in core activities
0.048 0.095** 0.049
(0.038) (0.047) (0.039)
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2008 2009 2010
Manufacturing sector (dummy)
-0.009 -0.003 -0.009***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
Western Balkan countries without the RS 
(dummy)
0.014 0.005 0.023***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.004)
The RS (dummy)
0.008 0.021*** 0.009
(0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
Mediterranean countries (dummy)
-0.006 0.002 0.011***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant
0.024** -0.002 -0.000
(0.011) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 8853 8830 8826
Hansen’s J chi2 (1) 0.06065(p = 0.8055)
(5) 7.04376
(p = 0.2174)
(5) 3.50885 
(p = 0.6220)
GMM C statistic chi2 (2) 2.50397(p = 0.2859)
(2) 2.53599
(p = 0.2814)
(2) 4.69633
(p = 0.0955)
Note: Service sector and core European countries serves as a base dummy
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Amadeus 2012; own calculations.
In all years, except in 2008, both investment variables are signifi cant in the 
OLS estimated models; in 2008 only the fi nancial investment variable is not 
signifi cant. Th e size of both investment variables coeffi  cients (accelerators) is 
approximately the same in both bust years, but not in the boom years, where the 
coeffi  cient of fi nancial investments is higher. 
Th e Western Balkan countries dummy is signifi cant in 2007, 2008 and 2010, 
Mediterranean countries dummy is signifi cant in 2007 and 2010 and RS dummy 
is signifi cant in 2008 and 2009. Th e size of the dummy coeffi  cient for the RS 
documents that the impact of the RS specifi ties in the debt build-up process 
diff ered from that in other studied countries. In 2007 and 2010 there was no 
signifi cant diff erence between the RS and the Core European countries, yet the 
Mediterranean and the Western Balkans group of countries had higher impact 
of investments on debt changes. In 2008, the eff ect of fi nancial investments on 
debt increases through the fi nancial accelerator in the RS was higher than in the 
Mediterranean countries and the Core European countries but lower than in the 
Western Balkans group of countries (without the RS).
Interestingly in the bust year of 2009 the RS had 2 percentage points higher 
impact (relative to the Core European countries) of the fi nancial accelerator or/
and correspondingly diff erent eff ect of the shape of fi rm investment distribution 
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on the debt increase. All other dummies for 2009 were insignifi cant, suggesting 
the delayed impact of the crisis on the RS. In the second year of the bust period 
(2010), the pick-up of the corresponding impact of the group of the Western 
Balkan and Mediterranean countries specifi ties were much higher.
Observing instrumental variables estimates in the boom years the diff erence 
of the impact of fi nancial accelerator and/or fi rms’ distribution of investment 
dynamics on the debt build-up process cannot be observed (country specifi ties 
disappeared – coeffi  cients are insignifi cant). In the collapse year (2009), the RS 
dummy reveals that basic empirical evidence about country specifi ties received 
by the OLS estimates is also confi rmed by the instrumentalized estimates. Th e 
same holds for the year aft er the collapse (2010), country specifi ties picked upped 
again, but the diff erence cannot be observed in the RS. 
Conclusion
In all the studied countries, high increases in debt before the collapse in 2009 
and drops aft erwards were limited to only a small share (around 10-25 percent) 
of enterprises (except for Slovenia where the debt increase was uniform across 
the distribution of enterprises). In the RS, the debt build-up process accelerated 
(relative to studied countries) especially in 2009 (especially at the higher end of 
distribution of debt dynamics); obviously the crisis came to the RS with a delay 
and smaller intensity than in benchmark countries.
In the RS (and also other countries of the sample) in the collapse year (2009), 
the relative debt increases of under and over median fi rms diff ered drastically. 
Th e over median fi rms debt increments were near and over the highest values in 
benchmark countries, while the under median fi rms were in the middle of fi rm 
debt increments in the other studied European countries. 
In the RS, the core investments dynamics in the climax of the boom period (in 
2007) documents much more conservative investment policy than in benchmark 
countries.; it was close to lowest country values attained in all other European 
countries studied. In 2009 the core investment activity was closer to highest 
values in all other countries in the sample, showing the undisrupted on going 
investment activity in the RS and decrease of it in other countries.
In all the studied countries the dynamics of fi nancial investments fl uctuated 
considerably less across fi rms than core investments dynamics, in the studied 
boom-bust period. Contrary to core investments, the outstanding values of the 
fi rm fi nancial investments were only limited to both decile ends of the fi rm 
distribution, while fi nancial investments of 80 percent of enterprises in the 
middle of the distribution were of small or even negligible size.
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In the boom years, the impact of fi nancial accelerator and specifi c enterprises 
distribution of investment dynamics on the debt build-up process was not as 
great in the RS as in some other European countries in the sample. In 2008, this 
additional eff ect (relative to the Core European countries) attained almost 2 
percent of balance sheet sum in the Western Balkan countries and only 1 percent 
in the RS. In the collapse year (2009), this country specifi c eff ects on the debt 
build-up process disappeared for all other observed countries except the RS, 
while in the year aft er the collapse they disappeared in the RS and picked upped 
again in all other countries, showing lagging of the impact of the crisis as well as 
a milder eff ect in the RS.
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